8.6.06

Austrália tenta pôr Jakarta contra Alkatiri

Enquanto mil e duzentos soldados australianos deixam queimar Díli, o governo autraliano e a própria imprensa tentam pôr a Indonésia contra Alkatiri. Aqui fica um artigo de opinião sobre o assunto.
A Austrália e os E.U.A. terão o que querem? Aquilo por que andaram a envenenar e a comprar a juventude através das organizações internacionais nestes últimos anos?



Caution over Timor Leste
Jakarta Post, 7 June 2006
Loro Horta, Singapore
Australian media reports stated that embattled Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri accused Indonesia of being behind the current wave of violence in Timor Leste. Such statements were never made by Mari Alkatiri. What Alkatiri said was that some members of the former pro-Indonesian militias took advantage of the military crisis to create instability and panic.
Many of these former militias were able to return to the country under President Xanana Gusmao's reconciliation policy. Many former pro-autonomy people were also integrated into the police force under the same reconciliation strategy. These individuals are now taking advantage of the crisis to further exacerbate the situation. As even recognized by the Australian force commander, many of the gangs spreading terror thought Dili are well coordinated and have been using the now dead Timorese police network communication systems.
No doubt that former militias have been doing their best to exploit the situation and further undermine the government. However, there is no evidence that the Indonesian government or even marginal factions within the Indonesian Military (TNI) are involved. On the contrary, the Timorese government is extremely appreciative of the restraint and positive way in which Jakarta has responded to the crisis.
The Australian media, which in the last few days has assumed an openly anti-Alkatiri stance, now seems to be trying to create misunderstanding between the two nations as a way to further isolate Alkatiri. No doubts that Mari Alkatiri should take most of the responsibility for the crisis, and his arrogant style of leadership has not done any good to the country.
However, Alkatiri has stated on various occasions that he is concerned by the interference in Timor Leste of certain Western powers, never mentioning Indonesia. The prime minister was actually strongly opposed to asking Australia for military assistance in the current crisis, and it was also Alkatiri who requested Malaysian troops as a way to balance Canberra's influence. It was also the prime minister who asked Malaysia and not Australia to take over security along the border with Indonesia.
Many members of the Dili government are far more concerned over Australian indentations than they are over Jakarta's. Many believe that Australia and the U.S. are to some extent behind the crisis. Obviously such suspicions are rather bizarre and unlikely for the crisis is primarily internal.
However, the recent comments attributed to Mari Alkatiri are rather strange in light of the excellent relations between President Yudhoyono and President Xanana on the one hand, and Ramos Horta amicable relations with Hasan Wirajuda.
So far the comments attributed to Alkatiri have managed to offend Indonesia and damage its international reputation. These allegations have created tensions between the two countries in a period when Timor Leste needs the support and solidarity of its large neighbor.
Why would Timor Leste have any interest in doing such a thing, considering that under President Yudhoyono's administration relations have improve remarkably?
Relations between the two nations have improved beyond all expectations, and today the two countries enjoy friendly ties. Perhaps too friendly for the taste of some people.
Timor Leste seeks and wants a closer future with Southeast Asia's largest democracy and the nation with whom it shares so much in common. In the difficult days that both nations will have to face, it is imperative that our leaders and peoples are not manipulated for the benefit of others.
The writer is a graduate of Sydney University and is concluding his master's degree in strategic studies at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University Singapore. He was previously an advisor to the Timor Leste Defense Department. The views expressed here are those of the author.